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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 




OGDEN CITYf a Municipal 
Corporation, and THE 
STANDARD CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 14249 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
OGDEN CITY 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by 
Appellant as he fell into a water meter manhole while 
traversing an Ogden City street. The Standard Corporation 
is the owner and occupier of the premises abutting the 
sidewalk area where the Appellant sustained injuries. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court granted Motions for Summary Judgment 
filed by both Respondents. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent prays that the Judgment be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of December 7, 1973, the Appellant, 
along with his wife and son, were traversing a sidewalk 
going West on 23rd Street in Ogden, Utah. (Dep. 10) At 
approximately 455 - 23rd Street, the Appellant stepped on 
a water meter cover (Dep. 16) whereupon the water meter 
cover slid away and the Appellant fell into the hole left 
vacant by the movement of the water meter cover (Dep. 18, 52). 
The Appellant claims no defect in the actual physical construe 
tion of the water meter cover or ring (Dep. 39, 51). 
The Affidavits of James F. Robinson (R 49-50) and Howard 
E. Martin (R 51-52), both employees of Ogden City Water 
Department, show that there was no defect in the construction 
or condition of the water meter cover or ring and that when 
replaced, the cover fit snugly into the ring, flush with the 
sidewalk. The Affidavits of Mr. Robinson and Mr. Martin as 
well as Jerry Reed, Ogden City Director of Public Works 
(R 53-54), show that Ogden City had no knowledge of any 
unsafe condition concerning the subject water meter cover 
or ring or any knowledge of complaints about the cover or 
ring having been lodged with Ogden City. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RECORD SHOWS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER 
RESPONDENT OGDEN CITY HAD ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF 
THE TRANSITORY CONDITION, AND ABSENT SUCH NOTICE, RESPONDENT 
OGDEN CITY WAS NOT NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The record shows that the accident is not attributable 
to any actual physical defect in the construction of the 
water meter cover or ring. Appellant makes no claim to the 
contrary. The apparent contention of the Appellant is that 
the water meter cover was not seated in the ring at the time 
of the accident and slid away under the weight of the Appellants 
foot, allowing him to fall into the hole. The record shows 
that Respondent Ogden City and its agents did not know of the 
water meter cover being out of its ring or of any defect or 
unsafe condition concerning the water meter cover and ring 
(R 49-54) . 
The sole question on this appeal is whether there is a 
genuine issue of fact whether the Respondent Ogden City 
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have 
known of the condition of the water meter cover, and whether 
it had a reasonable opportunity to remedy it. Unless Appellant 
can show by the affidavits and deposition on file how long 
the condition was present, no genuine issue of fact exists 
as to whether Respondent Ogden City is charged with construe-
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tive notice of the condition and whether it unreasonably 
failed to correct it, and the Judgment should therefore 
be affirmed. 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, so far as here 
material, provides: 
"(c) . . • The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material 
facts and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law • . . 
"(e) • . . When a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported as provided in this rule, an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allega-
tions or denials of his pleading, but his 
response by affidavits or as otherwise provided 
in this rule must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appro-
priate, shall be entered against him." (emphasis 
added) 
In Maloney vs. Salt Lake City, 1 Utah 2d 72, 262 P.2d 
281, (1953), plaintiff was injured when a section of the 
city sidewalk collapsed. This Court affirmed judgment for 
defendant notwithstanding a verdict for plaintiff, on the 
ground there was no evidence that any defect existed in the 
sidewalk prior to the accident. In stating the elements 
necessary to find negligence on the part of the city, this 
Court said: 
"In order to support this claim, the evidence must 
show that for some period of time before the accident, 
the sidewalk which collapsed Was in such condition, 
that it obviously presented a hazard to those 
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using it sufficient to give the city notice that 
there was a dangerously defective condition which 
it negligently failed to correct." 
Failing that evidence, the Court was compelled to make 
a finding adverse to the plaintiff. 
In Pollari vs. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 25, 176 P.2d 111, 
(1947), plaintiff claimed injuries from a fall as a result 
of stepping in a hole in a city sidewalk. Plaintiff appealed 
from a jury verdict, no cause of action. One ground of 
appeal was that the trial court had committed prejudicial 
error in defining the standard of care required of a city 
in discovering defects in public sidewalks. The court's 
instruction was as follows: 
"If you find from a preponderence of the evidence that 
the defects in the sidewalk at the place in question 
was of such a character as to constitute a hazard 
to pedestrians walking on such sidewalk while exercising 
due care for their own safety, and that said defect 
had existed for such a length of time that the 
defendant city, in the exercise of due care and 
their duty to maintain said sidewalk in a reasonably 
safe condition for pedestrian traffic, should have 
discovered the same and repaired it, . . . your verdict 
should be in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant. . ." 
This Court approved the instruction by stating: 
"We think the instruction given by the Court sub-
stantially states the law as to the city's duty 
and, therefore, there is no merit in plaintiff's 
contention . . . " 
The verdict was affirmed. 
The well settled standard is that a municipality cannot 
be held liable for a defect in a sidewalk without a showing 
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of actual knowledge of the defect or its existence for such 
a period of time that the city had constructive notice of it. 
The early case of Kiesel & Company vs. Ogden City/ 8 Utah 237, 
30 P. 758, (1892) also stands for the proposition that actual 
or constructive notice of a condition is a condition precedent 
to a finding of negligence on the part of the city. 
Appellant relies heavily on the case of Gordon vs. Provo 
City, 15 Utah2d 287, 391 P.2d 430, (1964), in his brief. The 
plaintiff suffered injuries when she stepped on a loose water 
meter cover. This Court sustained a verdict holding the 
. t 
city liable. 
The rule enunciated in the Gordon case does not differ 
from those cited in the previous cases. To be held liable, 
the city must have Either actual notice or constructive 
notice such that there was a reasonable opportunity to 
remedy the dangerous condition. Failing a showing of this, 
there could be no finding of negligence on the part of the 
city. 
The verdict in the Gordon case was based on the fact that 
some short time before the plaintiff fell into the water meter 
hole, she saw employees of the city removing the cover. The 
Lower Court held that the city had notice of the lid being 
loose when its employees had in fact left it loose. 
The facts of the Gordon case differ materially from 
those in the case at bar. Appellant has here failed to 
introduce into the record so much as a hint of evidence that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Respondent Ogden City had actual notice of any dangerous 
condition of the water meter cover and ring. He has 
introduced no evidence showing how long the condition 
existed prior to the accident. The record shows that the 
water meter hole had not been in use for a number of years 
(R 29) and thus there was no reason for agents of Ogden 
City to remove the cover. Appellant has failed to raise 
any material issue of fact tending to show negligence on the 
part of Ogden City. 
Appellant directed a substantial portion of his brief 
to the question of whether this accident arose out of a govern-
mental or proprietary function of government. His contention 
is that a city is liable for its negligence when engaged in 
proprietary or commercial activities and that the accident 
arose out of a proprietary activity. 
Respondent Ogden City does not concede the point that 
the accident arose out of a proprietary function but asserts 
that it is not a material distinction insofar as this appeal 
is concerned because the standard for those engaged in commercial 
ventures is no different than that set out in the foregoing 
cases dealing with municipal governments. 
There is a well established body of law from this Court 
dealing with the liability of merchants for transitory conditions. 
The concensus of the holdings of these cases is that liability 
cannot be imposed upon a merchant absent actual or constructive 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
notice of the condition. 
In Hampton vs. Rowley, 10 Utah 2d 169, 350 P.2d 151, (1960), 
plaintiff brought an action for injuries sustained when he 
slipped on a rock on a step on defendant's premises. Plaintiff 
appealed from a directed verdict in favor of defendant. In 
affirming the judgment, the Court outlined the governing law 
as follows: 
"In regard to a transitory condition of the character 
here involved, the instruction given is consistent 
with well established law that in order to find the 
defendants negligent it must be shown that they either 
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should 
have known, of any hazardous condition and had a 
reasonable opportunity to remedy the same." 
In Lindsay vs. Eccles Hotel Company, 3 Utah 2d 364, 284 P.2d 
477, (1955), plaintiff slipped on a small quantity of water 
which somehow got on the floor sometime after she was seated 
in defendant's coffee shop. This Court affirmed a directed 
verdict for defendant because: 
"There was no evidence as to how the water got onto 
the floor, by whom it was deposited, and exactly 
when it arrived there, or that the defendant had 
knowledge of its presence. Under such circumstances, 
a jury cannot be permitted to speculate that the 
defendant was negligent." (emphasis added) 
In Howard vs. Auerbach Company, 20 Utah 2d 355, 437 P.2d 895, 
(1968) plaintiff received a fall allegedly caused by oil on 
an escalator. The Lower Court entered summary judgment and 
this Court affirmed on the following grounds: 
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There is nothing in the record affirmatively or even 
controversally to show any negligence on the part 
of the store save an allegation to such effect and 
a denial thereof. The record is devoid of any 
indication who put any oil on the steps of the 
escalator or, if so, it was for such a time that 
the store people reasonably could have discovered 
and removed it." 
In accordance with the foregoing decisions are Koer vs. 
Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566, (1967), and 
Long vs. Smith Food King Store, Utah 2d , 531 P.2d 316, 
(1973). 
The most recent statement of this Court, Allen vs. 
Federated Dairy Farms, Inc. Utah 2d , 538 P.2d 175, 
(1975) , resisted urgings of the plaintiff to "liberalize" 
the rulings of the above cited cases. Justice Crockett stated: 
" . . . The correct policy is to accord fair and 
even handed justice to both by assuring to each 
the remedies and protections that the established 
rules of law give him; and when loss or injury 
occurs, to let it rest where it falls, unless it 
is affirmatively shown that another was at fault; 
and that that was the cause of the injury." 
That is precisely what Respondent Ogden City urges is 
that each party be accorded the remedies and protections that 
the established rules of law give it. Appellant has failed 
to place into the record any evidence that Ogden City was at 
fault. Such failure of evidence under Rule 56, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, compels the granting of summary judgment 
in favor of Ogden City. 
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POINT II 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF OGDEN CITY WAS A PROPER 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE. 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as cited above, 
provides that when a Motion for Summary Judgment is made and 
supported as provided in the Rule, an adverse party may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, 
but his response by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
the Rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment is to be entered against him. 
Ogden City's Motion for Summary Judgment was appropriately 
made and affidavits were filed with the Court and served upon 
counsel. The affidavit of Howard E. Martin (R. 51-52) shows 
that he was called to the scene of the accident and found 
the water meter cover on the sidewalk. He replaced the 
cover into the ring flange and the cover fit snugly into the 
ring, flush with the sidewalk. He was puzzled how stepping 
on the cover would dislodge it, and after he replaced it, 
he physically attempted to loosen it with his feet and jumped 
up and down on it, but was unable to dislodge it. The affidavit 
of Mr. Martin as well as those or James F. Robinson (R. 49-50) 
and Jerry Reed (R. 53-54) , all employees of Ogden City, state 
that none had personal knowledge of any defective condition 
of the water meter cover or ring prior to the occurrence. 
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They further state that they knew of no complaints of any 
defective condition prior to the occurrence. The first 
requirement of Rule 56 has therefore been met with the 
filing of the motion, properly supported. 
The burden then falls upon Appellant, by affidavit or 
otherwise, to set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial. The affidavit of Appellant 
(R. 56-57) was filed in response to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, but fails completely to raise any genuine material 
issue of fact. 
There is no statement in Appellant's affidavit or his 
deposition, both of record, which shows or attempts to show 
that Respondent Ogden City or its agents knew of any defective 
condition of the water meter cover. There is no showing of 
the length of time which the condition existed prior to the 
accident. Appellant has failed to meet his burden and 
Summary Judgment was expropriate. 
Without some showing of notice, the issue of Respondent's 
negligence would be open to pure speculation. The water 
meter cover could have been removed from its seat by unknown 
persons minutes before the occurrence. To hold Ogden City 
liable, given the facts of record, would be contrary to all 
authorities cited. 
Appellant repeatedly contends that he is unable to 
raise questions of fact because he has not had opportunity 
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for discovery in this case. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, provides in part: 
"(b). FOR DEFENDING PARTY. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or 
a declaritory judgment is sought, may, at any 
time, move with or without supporting affidavits 
for summary judgment in his favor as to all or 
any part thereof." 
The Rule makes no limitation on how long after commencement 
of a case, a Motion for Summary Judgment may be made by a 
defendant. Plaintiff filed his law suit May 29, 1974. The 
Motions for Summary Judgment were heard August 5, 1975— over 
15 months after the law suit was instituted. During those 
fifteen months, Appellant initiated no discovery procedings 
whatsoever towards Ogden City. Even the last ditch effort 
at discovery in the form of Requests for Admission, Interro-
gatories and for Production of Documents (R. 63-71) were not 
directed toward Ogden City. It should be noted for the record 
that the foregoing pleading was not filed with the Weber County 
Clerk until some hours after the Summary Judgment had been 
granted by the Court. 
It should be further noted that on March 6, 1975, Appellant 
filed with the Court a Notice of Readiness for Trial signed 
by his counsel (R. 32). It reads in part: 
"You will please take notice that the undersigned, 
Pete N. Vlahos, attorney for the plaintiff, herewith 
certifies: 
. . . 3. That such use of the rules of 
discovery as counsel feels necessary for 
the trial of this cause has been completed, 
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and that the case is at issue." 
Appellant's claim that there was no opportunity for 
discovery against Ogden City is betrayed by the passage of 
time between the filing of the Complaint and the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the fact that no discovery was directed 
to Ogden City throughout the pendency of the suit, and the 
certification of March 6, 1975, that use of discovery was 
complete and that the case was at issue. 
The provision in the pretrial order extending discovery 
to within ten days of trial was made at the request of 
counsel for Respondents to enable them to obtain an independent 
medical examination of Appellant as near the trial as possible. 
The case of Leininger vs. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing 
Company, 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 33, (1965) characterized 
Summary Judgments as follows: 
. . .Summary Judgment is not a substitute for 
trial but is rather a judicial search for deter-
mining whether genuine issues exist as to material 
facts. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
dictates the granting of Summary Judgment where 
there is no genuine issue of a material fact. The 
plaintiff in the instant case has attempted to 
create factual issues, but the whole purpose of 
Summary Judgment would be defeated if a case could 
be forced to trial by a mere assertion that an 
issue exists." 
Summary judgment rules are designed to effect an inexpensive 
and expedicious determination of litigation and should be 
granted where no genuine issues of fact exist. 
Ulibarri vs. Christenson, 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P.2d 170, (1954), 
-i *}-
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and Aetna Loan Company vs. Fidelity and Deposit Company of 
Maryland, 9 Utah 2d 412, 346 P.2d 1078, (1959). 
CONCLUSION 
There are no probitive facts in the affidavits or deposition 
before the Court to show how long the transitory condition 
concerning the water meter cover existed. In the absence 
thereof, there can be no genuine issue of fact as to whether 
Respondent Ogden City had a reasonable time to discover and 
correct it. Appellant has certainly had adequate time and 
opportunity to discover such facts. There is nothing con-
tained in Appellant's counter affidavit filed after the hearing 
of the Motion for Summary Judgment, which showed how long the 
transitory condition existed. 
The issue here is: Should Respondent Ogden City have 
discovered the condition. It cannot be said whether Respondent 
should have discovered it unless it is known how long the 
condition existed. The time element is missing and hence 
there is no probative basis for inference that Respondent 
unreasonably failed to discover it. 
Respondent Ogden City respectfully submits that the Summary 
Judgment in its favor should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Kim R. Wilson 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
Seventh Floor, Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Respondent 
Ogden City 
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